The Break
On January 27, 2024, an attack by drones hit a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export terminal in Ust-Luga, near St. Petersburg, Russia. The incident, claimed by Ukrainian intelligence (GUR), disrupted approximately 20% of Novatek’s LNG export capacity, the second-largest Russian LNG exporter. This event, seemingly marginal within the overall global energy flow, is a symptom of a broader strategy: targeted attacks on energy infrastructure to destabilize flows and increase costs for both Europe and Russia. Ukraine, deprived of direct access to the sea and dependent on Western aid, has transformed its strategy into an extension of the battlefield against critical infrastructure of its adversary, potentially affecting those who support it.
The Mechanics of Power
Ust-Luga, like other Baltic coast LNG terminals, is a crucial node in a complex logistics network. Natural gas extracted from Siberian fields is liquefied, transported by specialized oil tankers (known as “LNG carriers”) via sea to Europe for regasification and distribution. This chain depends on interconnected elements: extraction and liquefaction capacity, availability of oil tankers, LNG terminal regasification capacity, and maritime route stability. The Nord Stream, before its sabotage in 2022, represented a shortcut, bypassing transit countries and reducing costs. Its inoperability has forced greater reliance on LNG terminals and longer sea routes, increasing transportation costs and vulnerability to attacks.
Friction and Asymmetry
The attack on Ust-Luga highlights an increasing asymmetry. Russia, despite being an energy giant, is vulnerable to targeted attacks on its export infrastructure. Ukraine, with limited resources, can inflict significant damage at a relatively low cost by exploiting Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. This creates constant friction, driving up energy prices and destabilizing markets. Europe, in turn, finds itself in a difficult position: while it must support Ukraine, it also needs to protect its own energy infrastructure and ensure stable supplies. The cost of this protection is borne by consumers through higher prices and greater volatility. Germany, in particular, has been heavily impacted by the closure of Nord Stream, diversifying its supply sources and investing in new LNG terminals.
Test Doctrine
The theory of “gas geopolitics” by Marcel Merle, which highlights the strategic role of natural gas as a tool for power and influence, is confirmed in this scenario. Merle argued that control over energy resources and transit routes confers a significant advantage on exporting states. However, the attack on Ust-Luga demonstrates that this advantage can be eroded by targeted attacks on infrastructure, making control of the tap less absolute. The doctrine thus proves incomplete: the infrastructural vulnerability introduces an element of unpredictability and asymmetry not fully considered.
Tactical Horizon
In the next six months, it is likely that Ukraine will continue to focus on targeted attacks on Russian energy infrastructure, aiming to maximize damage and increase costs. Russia, in turn, may intensify attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure, particularly those related to grain and other agricultural exports. Monitoring naval activity in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea will be crucial for assessing the escalation of conflict. The rise in LNG and oil prices, combined with geopolitical uncertainty, could lead to greater energy market volatility and increased costs for European consumers.
Closing
The attack on Ust-Luga is not an isolated event but a signal of a deeper change in the nature of conflict. War is no longer fought solely on battlefields but also in critical infrastructure, transit routes, and energy flows. The strategic question is not whether Russia will win or lose, but whether Europe will be able to adapt to this new reality and ensure stable and secure energy supplies in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable world.
Photo by taichi nakamura on Unsplash
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