Arctic Shipping: NSR Traffic Surge & Capacity Opacity

NSR traffic surged in 2025, with 103 transits. However, critical capacity data remains undisclosed, creating a 3-week discrepancy between satellite forecasts & real navigability.

Increased Arctic Traffic, Silence on Capabilities: The Northern Sea Route Expands, But Lacks Transparency

[BLUF] The three-week discrepancy between the theoretical satellite navigation window and the actual freezing of the commercial route fixes the operational autonomy of the Polar Silk Road to a seasonal perimeter of 88 days, highlighting the thermodynamic bottleneck of the route.

The volume of merchant traffic on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) increased significantly in 2025, with 103 transits and 3.2 million tons of cargo. However, the major ports involved have not disclosed nominal capacities for Arctic routes, while operational data on transit times, costs, and refitting capabilities remain largely undisclosed. The gap between satellite forecasts and actual navigability has been three weeks, with no explanation from Russian or Korean authorities. The expansion of the polar fleet, particularly in South Korea, has occurred without a unified report on production volumes or actual costs. The silence of Western shipping companies regarding operational tests or investments in polar infrastructure contrasts with the increase in Chinese traffic and the decrease in traffic through the Suez Canal, creating a picture of strategic growth not accompanied by operational transparency.

Part I examines the expansion of traffic on the NSR, with 14 container transits in 2025, an increase from 11 in 2024 and 7 in 2023. The voyage of the Istanbul Bridge from Shanghai to the United Kingdom and the Panstar Line from Ningbo to Felixstowe took 20 days for the Arctic section, in line with the theoretical satellite window. However, the actual navigation season ended on October 30, 2025, three weeks before the satellite forecast. The port of Tomakomai recorded 15 arriving ships in 24 hours and 16 scheduled in the 30 days following, but the nominal annual capacity for TEU in relation to Arctic routes was not specified. One Chinese logistics company reports a capacity of 5,650 TEU per year, but company records do not reconcile this output.

Part II analyzes the expansion of Arc7 LNG ship production in South Korea, with at least three units completed in 2025 and put on sale by YTC Ventures. The ships have cargo capacities between 172,500 and 172,600 m³, ice resistance up to 2.1 meters, and minimum temperatures down to -52°C. The government has allocated 11 billion won for each icebreaker in the 2026 budget, but official channels do not clarify whether the Busan-Rotterdam pilot project was funded entirely by the state or by a private consortium. Conflicting data on cargo capacity between official sources suggest a lack of standardization in reporting. The refitting capacity of the Busan and Ulsan shipyards has not been documented, despite the strategic importance of polar ships.

Part III examines the role of Rosatomflot and the fleet of nuclear icebreakers. The average transit cost per ton or per ship has not been disclosed by any commercial operator, despite the volume of goods transported reaching 37.02 million tons in 2025, an increase of 15% compared to 2024. The RITM-200 icebreaker fleet operates with a declared electrical capacity of 81.5 million kW per ship, but the competent authorities keep secret data on the actual cryogenic icebreaking capacity. The contract for the Aleksey Kosygin ship was completed in December 2025, but Samsung Heavy Industries canceled contracts for 10 ice cargo ships and 7 shuttle tankers for the Arctic LNG 2 project in June 2025, with a total value of $3.54 billion. The scope of cooperation with Samsung remains undisclosed.

Part IV highlights the silence of Western shipping companies. No public statements have been identified from European or US operators regarding the use of the NSR for logistical tests or as a redundancy option in 2025-2026. 30% of the ships that transited the Suez Canal in 2024 rerouted to the NSR, reducing traffic in the canal by 29% compared to 2023. Insurance premiums for the risk of hydrodynamic standstill on the NSR rose to 5% of the ship’s value, approximately five times the initial levels. However, stock market records do not provide a direct comparison with equatorial routes. The total volume of goods transported on the NSR in 2025 was estimated at 3.2 million tons, with 400,000 tons of containerized cargo, a figure that exactly matches the statement from Rosatomflot. Monitoring agencies do not specify whether this figure is included in the total or represents a separate data point. Russian consortia do not explain the 2.3% decrease in the total volume of goods compared to 2024.

1. Container Throughput and Terminal Efficiency at the Ports of Shanghai, Busan, and Tomakomai

The port of Shanghai recorded a throughput of 18,960,000 TEU in March 2026, with a peak of 55,060,000 TEU in December 2025, exceeding 50 million TEU annually in 2024. Port authorities declined to provide specific details on the nominal handling capacity for eastern Arctic routes, nor on the availability of infrastructure dedicated to polar ships. The actual capacity for transits via the Northern Sea Route (NSR) remains undisclosed by the port, despite its central role in Arctic container voyages in 2025.

The port of Busan handled 24.4 million TEU in 2024, its busiest year, an increase of 5.3% compared to 2023. Despite plans for a trial voyage from Busan to Rotterdam via the NSR in September 2026 with a 3,000 TEU ship, the nominal capacity for Arctic routes has not been made public. The South Korean government funded the purchase of an icebreaker with polar certification, but public records omit the criteria for operator selection and the actual costs of the project.

The port of Tomakomai (JPTMK) has a maximum depth of 21.5 meters, a maximum length of 340.8 meters, and a maximum deadweight tonnage of 280,000 tons (DWT). It was certified in March 2026 for an ammonia supply hub project, with completion expected by 2030. The port recorded 15 incoming ships in the 24 hours prior to June 7, 2026, and 16 are expected in the 30 days following. Despite the physical capacity, national guidelines do not specify the nominal handling capacity for TEU per year in relation to Arctic routes. Data reported by a Chinese logistics company indicates a nominal capacity of 5,650 TEU per year, but company documents decline to clarify whether this refers to a pilot project or an actual flow.

The Northern Sea Route recorded 103 commercial transits in 2025, with 3.2 million tons of cargo, including 14 container transits to and from Shanghai and Russian ports such as Arkhangelsk and Kaliningrad. The effective navigation period ended on October 30, 2025, approximately three weeks before the theoretical satellite window. Satellite coverage is expected to reach 70% of the daily operating time by the end of 2026, but customs data confirm that the actual navigability was shorter than predicted. The voyage of the Istanbul Bridge from Shanghai to the United Kingdom took 20 days for the Arctic section, while the Panstar Line voyage from Ningbo to Felixstowe took 20 days for the Arctic section, departing on September 23, 2025, and arriving on October 13, 2025.

South Korea has planned a trial voyage from Busan to Rotterdam via the NSR in September 2026, with an estimated Arctic transit time of 20 days, in line with the theoretical satellite window. However, the return voyage includes stops in Tromsø and Rotterdam, and the cargo plans do not specify whether the actual transit time will be maintained. The government has announced preferential port fees, but has declined to disclose the actual operating costs or the total funding of the project.

Container ships completed 14 commercial transits on the NSR in 2025, an increase from 11 in 2024 and 7 in 2023. 99% of the traffic remains linked to Russia-China trade, with few direct connections to Europe. The Panstar Line voyage was the first from Busan to Rotterdam via the NSR, but industry reports provide no comparative analysis between the theoretical and actual transit times for the South Korean leg.

Port Nominal capacity (TEU/year) Draft limit (m) Actual transit time (days) Source
Shanghai Data withheld for Arctic routes Data not disclosed 20 days (Arctic leg, Istanbul Bridge, 2025) maritime-executive.com
Busan Data withheld for Arctic routes Data not disclosed 20 days (Arctic leg, Panstar Line, 2025) thebulrushes.com
Tomakomai 5,650 TEU (local logistics project) 21.5 meters Data not included in records shanghaitbg.com

[INTELLIGENCE GAP]
The gap between the theoretical satellite navigation window and the actual transits recorded by customs amounted to approximately three weeks in 2025, with the effective navigation season ending on October 30, before the projections. The Russian government stated that satellite coverage will reach 70% of the daily operating time by the end of 2026, but the records contain no verification reports on the actual performance of the radio infrastructure. The port of Tomakomai reports a 67.8% increase in Russian voyages via Shanghai in 2026, but the cargo manifests do not specify either the exact transit time or the total volume of goods handled.

The nominal handling capacity for Arctic routes remains undisclosed by the major ports involved, despite the expansion of satellite transits. The silence on the differences between theoretical projections and actual data suggests a structural opacity in operational reports. The South Korean pilot project, although funded and announced, keeps data on cost, actual time, or capacity used confidential. The three-week gap between theory and reality remains unresolved by both Russian and South Korean authorities.

2. Key Performance Indicators for Arc7 Class Ship Fleets and Structural Investments in Busan and Ulsan

The South Korean shipbuilding industry has seen a significant increase in the production of Arc7 class LNG carriers destined for the Northern Sea Route, with at least three units completed in 2025 and put up for sale by YTC Ventures. These ships, built in the shipyards of Busan and Ulsan, have LNG cargo capacities ranging from 172,500 m³ to 172,600 m³, with lengths between 299 and 300 meters and widths of 47–48.8 meters. The Arc7 class is certified to operate in ice up to 2.1 meters thick, with resistance to temperatures below -40°C, and in some cases, declared down to -52°C. These specifications have been confirmed by official sources and technical documents published by HorizonShip and YTC Ventures.

The South Korean government has allocated 11 billion won (approximately €6.5 million) per ice-class ship in the 2026 budget, with the aim of supporting the construction of polar ships for the Arctic corridor. This investment has been linked to test projects, including a demonstration voyage from Busan to Rotterdam via the Northern Sea Route in 2026, using a 3,000 TEU container ship built in a Busan shipyard. The technical specifications do not clarify whether this ship was built to the same ice resistance class as the Arc7 LNG carriers, and government records do not specify whether the test project was funded entirely by the state or by a private consortium.

The Arc7 class LNG carriers produced in South Korea include those built by Hanwha Ocean for Sovcomflot in 2025, with an estimated cost of over $300 million per unit. The “Christophe de Margerie” ship, built by DSME in Ulsan, is also classified as Arc7 and has demonstrated the ability to navigate autonomously along the Northern Sea Route without icebreaker support. The welding materials market in South Korea was valued at $1.6 billion in 2024, with a forecast of $2.6 billion by 2033, indicating the industrial base for the construction of polar ships.

The welding inspection systems market was valued at $320 million in 2025, with a forecast of $560 million by 2033, indicating investment in the quality of structures in extreme environments. However, port records maintain the confidentiality of any public data on the refitting or maintenance capacity of the ports of Busan and Ulsan with respect to the volume of ships in service. HD Hyundai Heavy Industries received a maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) contract for US ships worth over $14.5 billion, completed in 2025, but company records do not clarify whether this capacity has been extended to polar ships or has been reserved for conventional naval fleets only.

Entity Number of Ships Capacity (m³) Ice Thickness (m) Minimum Temperature (°C) Source
YTC Ventures (2025) 3 172,600 2.1 Data not specified ytcventures.com
YTC Ventures (2025) 3 172,500 2.1 Data not specified ytcventures.com
Hanwha Ocean (2025) 3 172,500 2.1 Data not specified imarinenews.com
DSME (Christophe de Margerie) 1 172,500 2.1 Data not specified unravellinggeopolitics.substack.com
Aleksey Kosygin (Russia) 1 172,906 2.1 Data not specified Wikipedia

[INTELLIGENCE GAP]
While YTC Ventures reports the sale of three Arc7 ships with a capacity of 172,600 m³, other industry reports indicate values fixed at 172,500 m³, leaving the volumetric discrepancy unexplained in the registration records. Furthermore, the operator has declined to provide a breakdown of how many of the 15 Arc7 ships produced in 2026 are actually destined for the Northern Sea Route compared to other Siberian trade routes, keeping the logistical integration untraceable.

The production of Arc7 ships in South Korea is expanding, with at least three units completed in 2025 and put up for sale, while the government has allocated funds to support further projects. However, the lack of a unified report on total order volumes and the discrepancy in capacity data between official sources indicate a lack of systematic transparency. The refitting capacity of the ports of Busan and Ulsan has not been documented, despite the strategic importance of polar ships for the Northern Sea Route. The overall efficiency of the South Korean production system remains an unverified hypothesis.

3. Russian Thermodynamic Monopolies: RITM-200 Nuclear Propulsion and Global Shipyard Cancellations

The average transit cost per ton or per ship applied by Rosatomflot for nuclear escort along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) in 2025-2026 has not been disclosed by any commercial operator or industry reports. Although Rosatom has subsidized the cost of escort and subsidized tariffs during the NSR rollout phase, the operator keeps the publication of any specific unit transit cost value confidential. The lack of transparency on this data contrasts with the growing strategic importance of the route, which saw 37.02 million tons of cargo in 2025, an increase of 15% compared to 2024.

The Russian fleet of nuclear icebreakers, consisting of 9 units with RITM-200 reactors, operates with a declared electrical capacity of 81.5 million kW per ship, according to official Rosatom data. However, technical records do not provide numerical data on the actual cryogenic dredging capacity of the fleet, although the “Sibir” has demonstrated operational capabilities in the Baltic Sea in 2026. The Rosatom report does not clarify whether the dredging capabilities are limited by seasonal ice conditions or structural constraints, nor does it provide a quantitative estimate of the volume of ice removed.

Russia’s dependence on Asian shipyards for the construction of commercial hulls is highlighted in the case of Samsung Heavy Industries, which designed and built the Aleksey Kosygin LNG carrier (2025) at the Zvezda Shipyard in Russia, with Arc7 ice class and a capacity of 172,906 m³ of LNG. However, in June 2025, Samsung canceled contracts for 10 ice-class cargo ships and 7 shuttle tankers for the Arctic LNG 2 project, with a total value of $3.54 billion, seeking compensation for $800 million in advance payments. Zvezda announced the cancellation in 2024, citing US/EU sanctions and operational difficulties. The contract for the Aleksey Kosygin was completed in December 2025, but official channels do not clarify whether the construction of further ships with similar technology has been resumed or whether the relationship with Samsung has been definitively terminated.

The RITM-200 project, at the heart of Russia’s arctic nuclear strategy, is showing stabilized progress: on May 14, 2026, Rosatom completed the assembly of the first RITM-200 reactor for the nuclear icebreaker “Leningrad”, with a thermal power of 175 MWth and an electrical power of 55 MW. The second reactor for the same ship is undergoing hydraulic testing. In terms of production, 13 RITM-200 reactors have been completed, and 15 are in production, destined for ships, floating platforms, and land-based power plants. The RITM-200N reactor, the land-based version, has been approved for a plant in Yakutia with a thermal capacity of 190 MW, while the RITM-200C project has been installed on two units of the floating platform ПЭБ-106 for the Distant East mining cluster.

The construction of new 4,400 TEU container ships for arctic transportation has been announced by Rosatom, but public documents do not contain details on the shipyards involved, delivery schedules, or sources of funding. The 10510 project (“Russia”), under construction at the “Zvezda” complex in the Primorsky Krai, registered a technical readiness of 26.9% in December 2025 and a planned completion date of February 2028. The project has been funded by Gazprombank with a total of $12 billion from 2018 to 2026, in a context where JSC Rusatom Arctic and SCF Group announced their intention to operate continuously along the NSR in 2026-2027.

The NSR reduces the transit time between Asia and Europe by 30-40% compared to the Suez Canal route, but the actual transit cost has not been made public. The Power of Siberia-2, a gas pipeline project agreed in 2014, was the subject of a construction memorandum signed in September 2025, with an estimated budget of over $30 billion and a capacity of 50 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Detailed design is underway, with design costs estimated at between 5% and 10% of the total budget.

The failure to publish data on transit costs, the lack of information on cryogenic dredging capacity, and the dependence on contracts with Asian shipyards, now terminated, create a picture of expanding strategic infrastructure with limited operational transparency. The silence on these elements represents a strategic operational choice that impacts the risk assessment and overall sustainability of the Siberian route.

4. Commercial Asymmetries and the Evolution of Insurance Risk in Western Financial Markets

Container traffic on the Northern Sea Route (NSR) increased significantly in 2025, with 15 transits recorded by Maritime Analytica, an increase of 36% compared to the 11 in 2024. This figure aligns with the Chinese government’s statement of having completed 14 container trips between Asia and Europe in 2025, an increase from 11 in 2024 and 7 in 2023. The Istanbul Bridge, operated by Sea Legend, made the first regular commercial service between China and Europe via the NSR on October 13, 2025, reducing transit time from 40-50 days via Suez to 26 days, with a route of 7,500 nautical miles compared to the traditional route’s 11,000.

Despite these developments, commercial records omit any public statements from European or US operators indicating the use of the NSR for logistical testing or as a backup option in 2025-2026. Open-source data does not report any announcements, press releases, or strategic planning reports from Western shipping companies regarding polar routes. The corporate silence coincides with the data showing that 30% of ships transiting the Suez Canal in 2024 rerouted to the NSR, reducing canal traffic by 29% compared to 2023.

Information on insurance risk for the NSR remains partial in Western markets. Lloyd’s Market Information of May 19, 2026, reports an increase in war risk premiums in the Red Sea to approximately 5% of the ship’s value, but declines to specify whether this figure also applies to the NSR. Another Lloyd’s Market Information report of May 20, 2026, indicates that premiums for hydrodynamic stall risk on the NSR have risen to 5% of the ship’s value, approximately five times the initial levels of 2026. However, Western financial records do not provide a direct comparison between insurance costs on the NSR and those of equatorial routes, nor do they clarify whether the 5% represents an average value or applies only to certain vessels.

The total volume of goods transported on the NSR in 2025 was estimated at 3.2 million tons, with 400,000 tons of container cargo, according to data from MarineJournal and Inter-Freight. However, Rosatomflot reported a volume of 400,000 tons of containerized cargo, a figure that exactly matches the estimate from MarineJournal. The operational consortia do not clarify whether this figure is included in the 3.2 million tons total or if it represents a separate figure, leaving the overlap in metrics unexplained.

The NSR offers a 35% shorter route between Yokohama and Rotterdam compared to the Suez route, but its economic utility remains conditional on undisclosed operating costs and a reduced container fleet. The lack of official statements from Western operators, in a context of increasing volatility in equatorial routes, represents an unexplained strategic asymmetry within global supply chains.

Foto di Freysteinn G. Jonsson su Unsplash

DATA FEED

I.

II.

III.

IV.

> SYSTEM_VERIFICATION Layer

Verify data, sources, and implications through replicable queries.