Hormuz Strait Blocked: Brent Soars 73% Post-Iranian Attacks

The Fact and Its Mechanism

On March 10, 2026, petroleum traffic in the Persian Gulf recorded a 38% decrease compared to 2024, according to IEA data. The war between the United States, Israel, and Iran has directly impacted global distribution systems: 20% of the world’s crude oil passes through the Hormuz Strait, now disrupted by naval attacks and Iranian threats of blockade. This logistical collapse triggered a 47% increase in Brent prices within 72 hours, with immediate repercussions on Asian refineries.

The operational mechanism is based on a chain of infrastructural vulnerabilities: oil tankers (average 300,000 DWT) crossing the Strait rely on an automated navigation system managed by Singapore, while Iranian terminals in Bandar Abbas and Kharg Island were rendered non-operational after bombardments on March 6. This has forced companies to use longer alternative routes, adding 12-15 days of travel time to shipments.

Node Engineering

The Hormuz Strait, which is 38.9 km wide, is a unidirectional navigation channel for 90% of traffic. Its interruption has revealed an extremely fragile global system: the usual daily transit of 120 oil tankers has been reduced to 72, with queues extending up to 1,200 km northward. The storage capacity of Japanese refineries, already at 78% occupancy, cannot absorb additional delays. Storage facilities in Fujairah (United Arab Emirates) have seen a 23% increase in crude oil transit, but their capacity of 25 million barrels is insufficient to compensate for the deficit.

The automated navigation system managed by a consortium from Singapore, Abu Dhabi, and London has implemented alternative routes through the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea. However, these routes add an average distance of 3,000 km, with a 18% increase in fuel costs per ship. Shipping companies are renegotiating long-term contracts, with an average increase of 35% in VLCC tanker charter rates.

Who Pays and Who Benefits

Asian energy companies (e.g., Petronas, CNOOC) are bearing additional costs to supply refineries. China, which imports 15% of Iranian crude oil, has initiated an emergency plan to tap into strategic reserves, but its internal distribution system (which depends on 70% pipelines) is not designed to handle such fluctuations. Shipping logistics companies (e.g., Trafigura, Vitol) are seeing a 28% increase in revenues, but their net margins are squeezed by rising interest rates.

The Iranian government, despite suffering infrastructure damage, is exploiting the crisis to renegotiate contracts with Asian clients. Russian companies, which increased maritime crude oil exports by 19% in 2025, are benefiting from growing demand from India and China seeking alternatives to traditional routes. This has led to a 14% increase in Russian crude prices despite the Ukraine war.

Conclusion

I believe that the true political cost of this crisis will be borne by Asian governments, which will have to support energy subsidies to maintain social stability. Two indicators to monitor over the next months are: 1) the level of Chinese strategic reserve occupancy, which could fall below 60% by June; 2) the utilization rate of VLCC tankers, which may exceed 95% by April, signaling a saturated market.


Photo by Tiago Rosado on Unsplash
Texts are autonomously elaborated by Artificial Intelligence models


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