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The Unclosed Route: The Cascade Effect on Exports
The strategic blockade imposed by Yemen and supported by Tehran has not physically disrupted the transit of the Strait of Hormuz, but it has generated a structural contraction in global logistics capabilities. According to data provided by ICIS and reported by Reuters from April to September 2026, Iranian liquefied natural gas (LNG) exports have collapsed by 96%, with only 18 shipments sent compared to the 509 of the same period last year. This decline is not due to a physical blockade of the route, but to the loss of credibility of logistics operations and the increase in associated costs.
The mechanism is simple: shipping companies have avoided the route due to the risk of interception, increasing transit times and insurance premiums. The additional marginal cost has exceeded the profitability threshold for Iranian shipments, making them uncompetitive in the global market.
The Logistic Bottleneck: Alternative Capacities Reached Saturation
Alternative routes for transporting LNG from the Persian Gulf to Asia and Europe are limited. The most direct route is through the Strait of Hormuz, which handles over 17 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil and a significant share of liquefied gas. When transit is disrupted, ships must either navigate along the eastern coast of Africa or pass through the Suez Canal, increasing travel time from 12 to over 30 days.
The capacity of the Suez Canal is limited to approximately 50 transits per day. With a sudden increase in demand for alternative routes, saturation has caused average delays of 7-9 days in August and September 2026, as reported by FreightWaves. This is not only a matter of time: each lost day represents an $18 million loss for the global liquefied gas market, according to estimates from Rystad Energy.
Who Pays and Who Benefits from the Reconfiguration?
The main beneficiaries of the logistical reconfiguration were the regasification terminals in India and Japan. The port of Kochi, in India, increased its reception capacity by 40% in the second quarter of 2026 to handle ships avoiding the Strait. According to the Indian Ministry of Energy, this allowed an increase in LNG imports from 58% to 73% of national demand.
Conversely, Iranian producers suffered a net loss of $24 billion in revenue. The 96% decrease in export shipments made the South Pars project – which produced approximately 150 million cubic meters per day (m³/d) before the crisis – economically unsustainable, with a 42% reduction in production activities. The marginal additional cost for each ton of LNG transported increased from $180 to over $530.
The Trajectory and Structural Limit
The effect will not end with the conclusion of the conflict. The saturation of alternative routes has revealed a structural limit: the global logistics infrastructure is not designed to handle flows of goods under conditions of forced deviation. The average transit time from the Gulf to East Asia, already at 14 days before the crisis, is now estimated at 23 days.
The physical limit manifests in the capacity of regasification terminals and in the repair times for ships. The average cost of replacing a refrigerated container damaged during transit increases by 170%, as indicated by data from BNSF Railroad. If the instability persists for more than six months, cumulative losses will exceed $45 billion.
Photo by Neda azizi on Unsplash
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