Stabroek Block oil production hits 650,000-700,000 bpd with Berbice port bottleneck limiting expansion

The Operational Signal and the Bottleneck

In the context of Chevron’s acquisition of Hess Corporation for $53 billion USD, completed in mid-2025 following a controversial arbitration ruling against ExxonMobil, a strategically important asset has been consolidated: the Stabroek block off the coast of Guyana. The operation gives Chevron a 30% stake in a basin that holds over 11 billion barrels of equivalent oil and represents one of the most prolific offshore projects globally. Current gross production is around 650,000-700,000 barrels per day (bpd), with a 20% year-on-year increase in the second quarter of 2026, mainly driven by Hess assets integrated into the company’s portfolio.

However, the physics of extraction do not follow the pace of finance. The nominal production capacity of the four FPSO (Floating Production Storage and Offloading) units in service at the end of 2025 is estimated at approximately 900,000 bpd. This volume requires an onshore storage and transfer infrastructure that, at present, presents a documented structural criticality: the absence of a functioning deep-water port on the coast of Berbice. The most relevant operational signal is not the production record, but Chevron’s recent strategic decision to withdraw from funding the feasibility study for such port infrastructure.

This choice radically alters the timeframe for expansion. While ExxonMobil, the operator with a 45% stake and partner CNOOC (25%), aims to exceed 1.3 million bpd by 2027 thanks to six approved offshore projects, the surface logistics chain is not ready to support further acceleration without massive infrastructure interventions. The lack of a dedicated terminal imposes direct physical constraints on the frequency and volume of deep-water transfer operations.

Node Engineering: Nominal vs. Real Capacity

The critical node is identifiable within the onshore storage system. Currently, FPSOs like the Liza Destiny, Liza Unity, and Prosperity discharge crude oil onto tankers through offshore transshipment systems. While this solution is technically mature, it has inherent limitations related to oceanic weather conditions and the logistics of service vessels. The effective onshore storage capacity is therefore an operational constraint that determines how quickly crude oil can be fed into the global market without generating high demurrage costs or operational disruptions.

The Berbice deepwater port project, initially led by the engineering firm Bechtel in its preliminary phase, was originally funded by Hess Corporation before its acquisition. Harry Pastuszek, Engineering Director at Bechtel for Guyana, confirmed that while Hess covered the initial costs of front-end design and engineering, Chevron decided not to proceed with funding the subsequent phases of the feasibility study. This distinction between the availability of the geological resource and logistical accessibility is crucial: the reserves are physically present, but their efficient extraction depends on assets that take years to build.

The nominal capacity of the Stabroek Block is therefore not only a function of the floating units, but an integrated system that includes port throughput. The absence of a deepwater port means that every increase in production must be supported by an increasingly large fleet of tankers and variable waiting times. Supplier diversification is not relevant in this local context; the alternative capacity of subsea transshipment exists, but its marginal cost increases linearly with the volumes extracted.

Systemic Propagation and Margin Redistribution

The impact of this infrastructure choice propagates along the upstream value chain. Without a dedicated port, operators in the Stabroek Block remain dependent on logistics solutions that are highly capital-intensive to operate. Chevron’s decision not to participate in the costs of the feasibility study reflects a strategic assessment: the company is focusing cash flows on optimizing existing production and mature basins, postponing or delegating investments in long-term civil infrastructure.

This scenario creates an asymmetry between declared production capacity and the actual rate of commercialization. As reported by company sources, Chevron’s net profits grew significantly in the second quarter of 2026 thanks to Hess assets, but the sustainability of this growth at volumes exceeding 900,000 bpd is conditional on the availability of onshore infrastructure.

“For the remaining parts of the feasibility study, Chevron declined to proceed with funding.” — Harry Pastuszek, Engineering Director, Bechtel Guyana

The strongest counter-thesis is that ExxonMobil, as the operator with the majority share (45%), may be forced to internalize infrastructure costs in order to meet the 2027 production targets. However, the fragmentation of ownership and past contractual disputes make it unlikely that there will be a rapid coordination of investments in public capital goods. The redistribution of margins therefore sees Chevron benefiting from short-term cash flow without absorbing the risks of delays on port infrastructure, which primarily fall on ExxonMobil and CNOOC.

Evidence of Equilibrium and Trajectory Sentence

The infrastructural constraint of the Berbice port represents the determining factor for the production trajectory of the Stabroek block. The analysis indicates that, without a coordinated investment in onshore storage infrastructure, growth in production beyond 900,000 bpd will experience significant operational slowdowns. The falsifiability criterion for this thesis is observable through monitoring of the port’s construction timelines: if by 2027 there is no significant acceleration in the detailed engineering phase or in the start of civil works, the actual capacity will remain constrained by maritime logistics.

The public narrative surrounding the expansion of the Stabroek block focuses on production records and investments in new FPSOs. The data shows that the onshore infrastructure gap is becoming a structural bottleneck. Onshore storage capacity is the real constraint, not the availability of crude oil underwater.

At a nominal capacity of 1.3 million bpd targeted for 2027, the absence of the Berbice port will result in a structural logistical extra-cost and delays in actually achieving the declared volumes. The upstream Guyanese supply chain will have to confront the physical reality: reserves are infinite only as long as the storage tanks are not filled.

⎈ Generated by Multi-Agent AI (MAS) · Epistemic Safety · Human-in-Command
Read the Operational Disclaimer – Photo by Adam Gethin on Unsplash.com

> SYSTEM VERIFICATION LAYER