USA Nuclear Revival: $2.7B Funding, 2026 Operational Data Missing

$2.7B allocated for US nuclear supply chain revival & HALEU enrichment, yet operational data remains elusive. Persistent foreign reliance & SMR delays pose strategic risks.

nucleare USA dati operativi - 2,7 miliardi per il nucleare USA: dati operativi 2026 ancora invisibili

The United States has allocated $2.7 billion to rebuild the nuclear supply chain and accelerate HALEU enrichment, but there is no verifiable public data on the actual operational capacity of major facilities in the first half of 2026. Strategic dependence on foreign suppliers persists despite funding, while SMR projects and data centers are experiencing structural delays linked to undocumented fuel shortages.

The global HALEU enrichment market is dominated by Russia (Rosatom/Tenex), which covered 27% of U.S. requirements in 2024. The import ban that came into force in 2024 and becomes fully applicable from 2028 has shifted attention to domestic projects, but Western HALEU enrichment capacity is estimated at only 8.8 million SWU/year for 2026 — a figure not attributed to specific operators and lacking independent verification. Centrus Energy declares a guaranteed annual production of 900 kg of HALEU at Piketon, Ohio, but the plant’s actual capacity remains unverified after June 2025.

The DOE has awarded $900 million each to Centrus Energy, General Matter, and Orano Federal Services to develop domestic LEU and HALEU enrichment capabilities. However, neither the distribution of funding among projects nor the intermediate targets achieved by 2026 have been disclosed. Urenco USA has announced a capacity increase at the National Enrichment Facility (New Mexico) of 2.1 million SWU, but production is only expected from 2032. The silence on the real performance of ongoing projects prevents any critical assessment of the effectiveness of the investments.

Future demand for HALEU by 2050 is estimated at 96.5 million SWU/year. Western capacity in 2026 stands at less than 10% of that value. The Energy Solutions report of June 2026 indicates an annual deficit of 87.7 million SWU between available production and demand. Projects like TerraPower Natrium have experienced two-year delays due to the lack of certified HALEU; X-energy and Oklo Aurora have recorded delays in their SMRs with no specific binding orders for 2026.

Kairos Power’s Hermes 1 reactor, completed in 2026 at Oak Ridge, was fueled with HALEU supplied by the DOE and produced by Centrus Energy. The project represents the first operational demonstration of a molten salt reactor in the U.S., but no indication has been provided regarding supply traceability or the methods of fuel transfer to the site.

In parallel, Rosatom has maintained active nuclear fuel exports to the West despite sanctions. On May 14, 2026, the ZiO-Podolsk plant completed the first RITM-200 reactor for the icebreaker Leningrad, bringing to 13 the units produced by that day. Estimated annual production capacity ranges between 10 and 15 units/year with no official explanation. Tenex uses the Northern Sea Route as its main logistics channel for exports, with NRC licenses in effect until 2028.

The project to restart the Three Mile Island Unit 1 plant has been formalized with a long-term agreement between Microsoft and Constellation Energy. The contract value is stated between $16 billion and $18 billion for 20 years, but neither party has made public the clauses relating to force majeure or compensation in the event of non-supply due to fuel shortages. The technical delay related to interconnection with the PJM grid could move completion to 2031, generating additional costs estimated at $14.2 million per month for each month of delay.

The uranium market registers an annual demand of 50 million pounds against a domestic production of only 1 million in March 2026 — a shortage ratio of 50 times. The price fluctuated between $84 and $85 per pound, with forecasts of a structural floor at $100/lb. Production is concentrated in Kazakhstan (39%), Canada (24%) and Namibia (12%). Despite the ban on imports of enriched uranium from Russia from 2024 to 2040, it is unclear whether this policy directly affects contracts with Microsoft or Amazon.

The NRC has finalized a new fee rule setting a professional hourly rate of $337 for fiscal year 2026 and reducing fees to $154 per hour, with the aim of increasing cost predictability in nuclear projects. The total budget for U.S. nuclear programs for FY2026 was $137.23 billion — up 24% from FY2025. The budget for nuclear weapons activities amounts to $24.856 billion, an increase of $5.563 billion.

The strategic silence on contractual clauses in PPAs for data centers represents a critical point not addressed by available sources. While Microsoft has signed a $16 billion agreement, Amazon one for $18 billion, and Constellation Energy has obtained a $1 billion federal loan for the restart of the Crane Clean Energy Center plant in Pennsylvania, none of the parties have disclosed the contractual terms relating to force majeure or compensation in the event of interruption due to uranium shortages.

Part I examines the historical concentration of global enrichment capacity and the gap between strategic statements and operational data. Part II analyzes delays in SMR projects and gaps in the HALEU supply chain. Part III illustrates Russian production expansion despite sanctions, with active logistics via NRC licenses. Part IV explores the growing alignment between technology, energy, and public policy in the United States, shadowed by an absence of transparency on key contracts.

PART I.

The global uranium enrichment market registers a concentration of historical capacity, with Russia and Europe (France and Urenco) holding 90% of total production. In 2026, Western HALEU enrichment capacity is estimated at 8.8 million SWU/year, according to multiple sources including Energy Solutions and Guzman & Company. However, no official or verifiable estimate is available for Rosatom’s nominal HALEU operating capacity, nor the specific volume of SWU produced by Tenex in 2026.

Centrus Energy has declared an annual operational capacity of 900 kg/year for HALEU production at Piketon, Ohio, with deliveries made to the DOE in June 2025 and further deliveries expected through June 2026. The DOE contract provides for an increase in production capacity, but the final achievable level is not specified. The company has received $900 million from the Department of Energy to expand HALEU production and develop new centrifuges at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, with projects underway but with no confirmed completion date.

Urenco USA has announced a 50% enrichment capacity increase at the National Enrichment Facility (New Mexico), adding 2.1 million SWU, with production expected to start in 2032. The company has already expanded existing capacity from 4.3 to 6.4 million SWU/year, but no estimate of operating capacity in the first half of 2026 is available.

The U.S. government has awarded $2.7 billion in fixed-price contracts to three operators: Centrus Energy ($900M), General Matter ($900M), and Orano Federal Services ($900M). These funds aim to strengthen LEU and HALEU enrichment capacity, with projects underway at Oak Ridge (Tennessee), Paducah (Kentucky), and New Mexico. However, neither the expected final capacity nor the SWU volumes produced have been made public.

The ban on imports of Russian enriched uranium came into effect in 2024 and will be fully applicable from 2028. In 2024, Rosatom/Tenex covered 27% of U.S. requirements, but no updated data is available on the market share for HALEU in 2026. The DOE has stated that Western investments of $4.2 billion aim to reduce this dependence, but no source provides a quantitative framework of current or future production capacity by non-Russian operators.

Projected demand for HALEU by 2050 is estimated at 96.5 million SWU/year, while Western capacity in 2026 stands at only 8.8 million. The gap is not compensated by public data on actual HALEU production by Centrus or Urenco in the first half of 2026.

Despite official statements and funding, the nominal operational capacity of major global plants — Rosatom, Urenco USA, Centrus Energy — remains unverifiable in real time. The silence on actual production metrics in 2026 contrasts with the magnitude of the investments and the gravity of the strategic declarations.

Entity HALEU Capacity (SWU/year) Reference Sources Operational Notes in First Half of 2026
Rosatom/Tenex Not specified Source: persistencemarketresearch.com, watt-logic.com No public data on operational capacity or SWU volume produced in 2026.
Centrus Energy (Piketon) 900 kg/year (equivalent to ~1.8-2.5 SWU/year) Source: world-nuclear.org, powermag.com No estimate of actual capacity in the first half of 2026; production reported for 2025.
Urenco USA (New Mexico) 4.3 million SWU/year (current), +2.1 million planned Source: urenco.com, ans.org No declared operating capacity for the first half of 2026; initial production expected in 2032.

Global HALEU-capable enrichment capacity in Western countries is estimated at 8.8 million SWU/year, but there is no public report attributing this figure to specific operators. The silence on the actual performance of ongoing projects — Centrus, Orano, General Matter — makes it difficult to assess the effective reduction in dependence on foreign suppliers.

The DOE has announced a total investment of $2.7 billion to rebuild the nuclear supply chain in the United States. However, it has not been disclosed which portion of the funding has been allocated to each project nor which intermediate targets have been achieved by 2026.

HALEU enrichment capacity in the West remains insufficient relative to future needs, but the lack of updated operational data in the first half of 2026 prevents any critical assessment of the speed and efficiency of the investments.

PART II.

The HALEU program in the United States is at the center of a strategic acceleration that is failing to keep pace with the real demand of SMR projects under construction. In 2026, Kairos Power formalized a binding contract with the Department of Energy (DOE) to receive HALEU destined for the Hermes 1 reactor at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, with the aim of producing TRISO pebbles. The material was selected under the DOE’s HALEU Availability Program in 2025 and delivery is expected upon completion of the production phase. However, no indication has been made public regarding the transfer methods or supply traceability once delivered to the site.

Centrus Energy produced and delivered 900 kg of HALEU to the DOE on June 25, 2025, marking the first significant domestic supply. The company obtained a contract extension through June 30, 2026 with options for an additional eight years and a guaranteed minimum annual production of 900 kg. However, the actual production capacity of the Piketon (Ohio) plant has not been specified, nor are updated data available on its scalability beyond 2026. The Energy Solutions report of June 2026 indicates that HALEU enrichment capacity in Western countries is limited to 8.8 million SWU, while advanced projects require 96.5 million SWU annually. Russian production (Rosatom/TENEX), the only global commercial source before 2024, was able to meet world demand.

The ban on imports of Russian enriched uranium came into effect on August 11, 2024 with annual waivers until January 1, 2028. The DOE has awarded $2.7 billion to Centrus Energy ($900M), Orano Federal Services ($900M), and General Matter ($900M) to develop domestic HALEU and LEU enrichment capabilities. An additional $28 million contract was awarded to Global Laser Enrichment for advanced technologies, but no specific binding orders for SMRs have been reported in 2026.

TerraPower’s Natrium project has suffered a delay of at least two years due to the lack of HALEU. The reactor, which depended on Russian supplies, cannot proceed without certified fuel. X-energy and Oklo Aurora have also recorded delays in their SMR projects, with the DOE acknowledging the direct threat to timelines. The HALEU’s Turning Point report states that U.S. production remained below forecasts in 2026, creating a structural deficit.

The Hermes 1 reactor (35 MWt) was approved for construction in 2023 and completed in 2026. Its operation is scheduled for 2027, but no information is available on the actual fuel loading date. Hermes 2 (two units) began construction at Oak Ridge in 2026 with the aim of entering operation in 2030 as the first non-light-water reactor licensed by the NRC.

Antares Nuclear has signed a long-term agreement with Urenco for HALEU supply, but deliveries are only expected from 2031. The DOE has also allocated HALEU to Antares for a pilot microreactor scheduled for July 2026 and to Standard Nuclear to produce TRISO fuel pebbles for Radiant, with a demonstration project planned for 2026. However, no specific binding order for 2026 has been indicated by X-energy or Oklo.

SMR Project HALEU Supplier Contract Type (2026) Project Status
Kairos Power – Hermes 1 DOE / Centrus Energy Binding contract signed January 2026 Completed in 2026, operation expected 2027
TerraPower – Natrium Russia (pre-2024) Not available since 2024; two-year delay First loading expected in 2028
X-energy – Xe-100 Not specified No binding orders reported in 2026 Delay in SMR projects
Oklo Aurora Not specified No binding orders reported in 2026 Delay in SMR projects
BWRX-300 (GE Vernova) Not specified No binding orders for HALEU in 2026 Collaboration with AFRY for expansion in Europe, expected from 2026

Current U.S. HALEU production capacity is estimated at approximately 900 kg/year from Centrus Energy. Russia (Rosatom/TENEX) was capable of producing sufficient quantities to meet global demand before the import ban. The Energy Solutions report indicates an annual deficit of 87.7 million SWU between available capacity and future demand. No explanation has been provided as to why the DOE awarded $2.7 billion to three companies without establishing an aggregate production consistent with the needs of ongoing projects.

The actual capacity of Centrus Energy relative to Russia has not been verified by independent sources. The DOE has stated that domestic production is “under development,” but has not published data on the actual performance of the Piketon plant after 2025. Strategic dependence on foreign sources remains a critical point, even though federal investment has been massive.

Kairos Power’s Hermes 1 project represents the first operational demonstration of a molten salt reactor with HALEU supplied by the DOE. Its completion in 2026, despite global delays in SMR projects, indicates that the supply system has worked for selected players. However, the lack of a robust and scalable HALEU supply chain prevents rapid expansion of the advanced nuclear sector in the United States.

PART III.

On May 14, 2026, Rosatom’s ZiO-Podolsk plant completed assembly of the first RITM-200 reactor for the nuclear icebreaker Leningrad, bringing to 13 the units produced by that day. At the same time, another 15 RITM units are in various stages of production, destined for icebreakers and floating plants. The estimated annual production capacity for the plant is 10 units/year, but another document indicates a forecast of 15 units/year, with a $300M investment linked to the FPU-106 project. The RITM-200 reactor has a thermal capacity of 175 MW and produces 30 MWe for propulsion or 55 MWe in electric configuration, with a refueling cycle ranging from 6 to 10 years depending on the installation.

Regarding nuclear fuel, the four plants at Zelenogorsk, Angarsk, and Novouralsk are implementing generation 9+ centrifuges for enrichment. However, overall capacity in SWU has not been made public by any official source or the Russian industry. Russia’s annual natural uranium consumption is estimated at 5,500 tonnes, with Tenex managing nuclear fuel cycle exports to the U.S. and Europe.

In May 2026, the NRC issued two licenses for uranium exports to Russia: one (XSOU8861) for 8.5 million kg of U as UF6 from Solstice Advanced Materials to TENEX (Moscow), and another (XSOU8865) for the same quantity to the Urals Electrochemical Plant (Novouralsk). Both licenses expire on December 31, 2028. Solstice Advanced Materials has announced an increase in uranium conversion capacity at Metropolis Works, with expected production of over 10 kilotonnes of UF6 in 2026 — a 20% increase over planned capacity for 2024. The site operates under an NRC license until 2060.

Tenex uses the Northern Sea Route as the main logistics channel for nuclear fuel exports to the U.S. and Europe, with deliveries by ship. Despite international sanctions, transport has been maintained through NRC licenses and collaborations with U.S. operators.

Regarding VVER reactors, Rosatom completed the pilot operation of MOX fuel for VVER-1000 reactors at Unit 1 of the Balakovo NPP on April 8, 2026, with three innovative assemblies containing 312 rods (18 MOX) and chromed claddings. The REMIX fuel pilot cycle was completed on April 1, 2026, with six assemblies test-irradiated for three 18-month cycles.

The Kursk 2-1 plant (VVER-TOI) generated over one billion kWh during the pilot phase, with a declared electrical capacity of 1,300 MWe. The Uzbekistan project envisages two VVER-1000 of 3,000 MWth each and two RITM-200N of 55 MWe, with delivery of six units expected by 2027.

Total annual fuel production for RITM-200 reactors in 2026 has not been disclosed. The total production capacity of the Zelenogorsk, Angarsk, and Novouralsk nodes in SWU remains unspecified. The logistics channel used by Tenex to maintain exports to the West is the Northern Sea Route, but no public report explains how customs controls or post-sanction regulatory compliance are managed.

UF6 production by Solstice Advanced Materials in 2026 was declared at over 10 kilotonnes, with an order backlog of $2.2 billion. However, there is no public document directly linking this production to the actual capacity of Russian enrichment nodes.

The silence of Russian authorities on overall SWU capacity and the operational methods of post-sanction nuclear logistics represents a structural absence of transparency, despite the presence of international licenses and significant investments. The RITM-200 reactor production system is expanding, but figures on annual production capacity vary between sources without any official explanation.

Russia has maintained active nuclear fuel exports to the West despite sanctions, thanks to NRC licenses and the use of alternative sea routes. The total fuel cycle production capacity for VVER and RITM reactors in 2026 remains largely undisclosed.

PART IV.

The project to restart the Three Mile Island Unit 1 nuclear plant in Pennsylvania has been formalized with a long-term agreement (PPA) between Microsoft and Constellation Energy, which provides for the supply of 835 MW of carbon-free energy for Microsoft’s data centers in Pennsylvania, Virginia, Ohio, and Chicago. The total estimated investment for the plant’s conversion is $1.6 billion, with a $1 billion federal loan obtained by Constellation Energy from the Department of Energy (DOE).

The original plan envisaged restart by 2028, but updated sources indicate a technical delay related to interconnection with the PJM power grid. The project has been further postponed to 2031 due to a lack of grid upgrades, although Constellation Energy has stated its intention to accelerate procedures to achieve completion by 2027. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has approved the procedure as a necessary condition for restart.

The contract value of the PPA has been stated inconsistently: according to SMR Intel, Microsoft would have signed a $16 billion agreement for 20 years, while other sources indicate a value of $18 billion for a similar contract with Amazon for a different plant. Neither party has made public the specific clauses relating to force majeure or compensation in the event of non-supply.

The report The Uranium Squeeze notes the existence of a penalty of $350/MW for non-supply due to fuel shortages in the core, but does not identify the contracting party nor specify whether such a clause is applicable to the PPAs with Microsoft or Amazon. The uranium market registers an estimated annual demand of 50 million pounds, against a domestic production of only 1 million pounds in March 2026 – a shortage ratio of 50 times. This imbalance has been linked to increased demand from AI data centers.

The uranium price fluctuated between $84 and $85 per pound in March 2026, with forecasts of a structural floor at $100/lb. Production is concentrated in Kazakhstan (39%), Canada (24%), and Namibia (12%). The U.S. government has introduced a ban on imports of enriched uranium from Russia from 2024 to 2040, reducing foreign dependence by 20-25% of domestic supply. However, it is unclear whether this policy directly affects Microsoft or Amazon contracts.

The cost of residual capacity offers in the PJM market for the 2027/2028 period reached $333.44/MW-day, at the limit approved by FERC. In 2026, data indicate a capacity price increase to $329/MW-day compared to the previous $29/MW-day, generating multi-million dollar additional costs for data center operators.

The U.S. government has allocated $2.7 billion in the 2025-2026 biennium to strengthen domestic enriched uranium production and the nuclear supply chain. The DOE allocated $800 million to TVA and Holtec for the distribution of SMR reactors in December 2025, but no information is available on how such funds are linked to contracts with Microsoft or Amazon.

Constellation Energy’s total nuclear fleet capacity is estimated at ~21.8 GW, with an overall generation capacity of ~33 GW. Talen Energy operates a nuclear plant in Pennsylvania with a total generation capacity of ~10.7 GW and a stock market valuation of $15 billion in 2026.

Contractual clauses relating to force majeure in the PPAs between Microsoft (Three Mile Island), Amazon (Talen Energy), and Google have not been made public. No source has specified the unit compensation in USD/MWh foreseen for non-supply due to fuel shortages in the core, nor has it clarified whether such clauses are binding or subject to review by FERC.

The delay in connection to the PJM grid could cause an additional cost of $14.2 million per month for each month of delay on 60 MW projects. The U.S. government suspended a tax deduction for data centers in Ohio from May 28, 2026, due to pressure on energy costs.

The NRC finalized, on June 16, 2026, a new fee rule setting a professional hourly rate of $337 for fiscal year 2026 and reducing fees to $154 per hour, with the aim of increasing cost predictability in nuclear projects.

The total budget for U.S. nuclear programs for FY2026 was $137.23 billion, up 24% from FY2025. The budget for nuclear weapons activities in FY2026 amounts to $24.856 billion, an increase of $5.563 billion over the previous year.

The Piketon (Ohio) project, funded by a public-private partnership between the DOE and SoftBank for $33.3 billion, envisages the construction of a 10 GW data center with up to 9.2 GW of power generation from natural gas. The project includes the installation of $4.2 billion in transmission lines by SB Energy and American Electric Power (AEP) Ohio.

The lack of information on specific contractual clauses in nuclear PPAs for data centers represents a strategic silence. While Microsoft has signed a $16 billion agreement, Amazon one for $18 billion, and Constellation Energy has obtained a $1 billion federal loan for the restart of the Crane Clean Energy Center plant in Pennsylvania, none of the parties have disclosed the contractual terms relating to force majeure or compensation in the event of interruption due to uranium shortages.

The electricity capacity provided by Three Mile Island Unit 1 is stated as 835 MW, sufficient to power approximately 800,000 U.S. households. However, the delay in connection to the PJM grid could compromise the actual availability of energy within the expected terms.

The dynamics of the nuclear market in the United States are characterized by a growing alignment between large technology companies, energy operators, and public policies. However, transparency on key contracts remains limited.

The silence of the parties involved on force majeure clauses and compensation in the event of fuel shortages represents a critical point not addressed by available sources. The lack of public information on contractual obligations makes it difficult to assess the real level of financial protection for investors and end consumers.

 

Foto di Evgenii Vasilenko su Unsplash
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