Lobito Corridor: Draft Constraints & 2.2 Mt Forecast to 2026

port-infrastructure

The logistical difference between Lobito and Dar es Salaam: infrastructural constraints and operational costs

The port of Lobito has a draft limit, which, according to available data, ranges from 9.4 to 10 meters for the quays, with an anchorage depth ranging from 14 to 15.2 meters. This configuration forces larger ships, such as ParanaMax and Handymax classes, to transshipment operations to transfer goods to smaller vessels. This condition increases operating times and introduces additional costs related to loading-unloading, intermediate container management, and the risk of damage during maneuvers.

On the eastern side, the port of Dar es Salaam does not have explicit draft limitations in the available data; its infrastructure is managed by DP World, which operates with a standardized tariff system.

The PID TPA (Port Infrastructure Development charge) applied by the Tanzania Ports Authority amounts to 0.09% on the customs value of domestic goods, valid from January 2026 and documented in the tariff book of April 13, 2026. — Tanzania Ports Authority

The Lobito Corridor has recorded an increase in volumes from 85 kt in 2022 to 2,200 kt expected for 2026, with a growth of 2,576% in four years, driven by the extension of the DRC-Zambia railway network and the revitalization of the LAR (Lobito–Angola Railway). However, the SNCC (Dilolo-Kolwezi) section presents critical conditions that aggravate transit costs along the route.

The TAZARA project, financed with $1.4 billion by CCECC for 30 years, includes the rehabilitation of 1,860 km of track and the purchase of 32 locomotives and 762 wagons, with an operational center and a training center covering 21,800 square meters. The LAR railway has already doubled volumes in 2025 compared to 2024, reducing transit time from 45 to 8 days.

The actual difference between Lobito and Dar es Salaam for Kolwezi concentrates remains unquantified in the available data. The presence of physical constraints (draft), additional costs (transshipment), and tariff charges (PID TPA) suggests a significant operational gap, but the lack of integrated estimates prevents a complete assessment of the final cost.

Cobalt Export Restrictions and Increasing Chinese Control by 2026

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has imposed an annual export cap for cobalt of 96,600 metric tons for 2026, which is less than half of the 2024 production — estimated at 220,000 tons — with the aim of strengthening internal refining capacity and ensuring a controlled flow to strategic partners.

According to industry sources, companies controlled by China manage approximately 80% of the DRC’s mining production and up to 10% of global refining capacity. This concentration results in an operational model where logistical flows are directed towards Chinese plants, even when exports occur through Western channels.

The price of cobalt hydroxide rose from $20,000 to $58,000 per ton between February 2025 and January 2026, in response to the restrictions. The quotas assigned for the fourth quarter of 2025 — extended to the first quarter of 2026 — were 18,125 tons, but only one-third of this volume was actually exported due to logistical delays and operational limitations.

ARECOMS announced the recovery of unused quotas in the first half of 2026 — for a total of 32,000 tons of metallic cobalt — with redistribution to a strategic pool, prepaid by mining companies from the DRC in May 2026. — Agency for Regulation of the Mining Sector of the DRC (ARECOMS)

However, the quota actually allocated to Chinese smelters within this mechanism has not been quantified in the available documents. The DRC signed a duty-free trade agreement with China in May 2026, which includes the allocation of lithium to Chinese processors through formal off-take agreements. Specific data on CMOC (TFM/KFM) and Sicomines mining quotas contractually linked to refining in China have not been disclosed, nor has the percentage of production legally bound.

The combination of limited export quotas, Chinese control over refineries, and logistical infrastructure oriented towards Beijing makes Western diversification simply a transport vector for Asian buyers. The reduction in Congolese cobalt exports, without clear transparency on allocated quotas, creates an opaque market and increasing strategic dependence.

OCP’s Strategic Repositioning in the Global Phosphate Fertilizer Market

The temporary suspension of anti-dumping duties on Moroccan phosphate fertilizers by the U.S. government, which occurred on June 29, 2026, allowed OCP Group to resume direct shipments to the United States. The first shipment of 54,000 tons of TSP arrived at the Port of New Orleans on August 17, 2026. — OCP Group, official statement

OCP has consolidated its competitive advantage through integrated production in Jorf Lasfar, where direct access to phosphate rock reserves and integration with green hydrogen plants — supported by a German investment of $32 million (30 million euros) for the annual production of 100,000 tons of green ammonia — reduces the marginal cost of the production process. This energy integration allows OCP to operate with superior logistical and environmental efficiency compared to its main competitors.

The cadmium intensity of Moroccan DAP was assessed at 0.550 within the CBAM context, which is 38% lower than OCP’s actual intensity (0.76), with an estimated annual tariff advantage of between €25 million and €29 million. This technical compliance allows OCP to bypass environmental restrictions in Europe without resorting to additional purification processes, making its supplies more competitive compared to Russian or Chinese products that do not meet EU standards.

In 2026, Brazil imported 49.1 million tons of fertilizers, with only 40-45% of the supplies needed for the next campaign purchased. In this context, OCP sold 30,000 tons of MAP to Brazil at $800–805 per ton CFR and a total of 90,000 tons to Latin America (excluding Brazil), with prices between $810 and $820 per ton CFR for MAP. In parallel, India confirmed an allocation of 2.5 million tons from Morocco during the period 2025–2026, covering 28.9% of the Indian market (2.5/8.61 MT).

The Strait of Hormuz blockade disrupted the annual import of 3.7 million tons of sulfate from Persia — essential for the production of phosphate fertilizers — exacerbating tensions in the supply chain. The combination of this disruption with Mosaic’s reduced production capacity has created a supply gap that OCP is filling in strategic markets such as the USA, India and Brazil.

Morocco’s position in the phosphate market, confirmed by a U.S. federal court on March 12, 2026, provided a greater degree of certainty for long-term contracts. — Federal Trade Proceedings, March 12, 2026

OCP has therefore replaced Russian and Chinese supplies in markets with high deficits thanks to the control of marginal costs in Jorf Lasfar and compliance with EU cadmium limits, reshaping the geopolitical balance of critical materials. However, updated data on the actual production capacity of green hydrogen in operational phase as of July 31, 2026, are not available.

Infrastructure financing as a tool for transferring energy and financial risk

The Zambian electricity grid resilience program, with a planned investment of $275 million over 15 years, was financed through early repayment of the $1.365 billion sovereign Eurobond debt. — African Development Bank (AfDB)

This transaction, supported by the AfDB and the Bank of Zambia, freed up resources for energy infrastructure, reducing debt service from 30% to 25% of the post-swap government budget. External financing ($600 million from AfDB and $550 million from Banco da Zambia) covers only a portion of the total program cost, leaving the operational risk associated with grid modernization to the Zambian government.

In Angola, debt service absorption reached 56% of public spending in the second quarter of 2026 ($5.32 billion), exceeding social spending threefold ($1.56 billion). Despite a current surplus of 753.9 billion kwanzas in the second quarter — generated by oil revenues at $102 per barrel — external debt absorbed 45% of total financial expenditures (3.66 billion), with a total debt service cost of $16.2 billion in 2026.

The 2,000 MW Angola-DRC-Zambia electricity interconnection project, initially agreed with Trafigura and ProMarks in July 2024, was abandoned by the private company in July 2026 during the feasibility phase. — HVDC World, August 2026

The withdrawal created a critical energy deficit for mines in Kolwezi and the Copperbelt, where expected demand will reach 240 MW by 2026. The cost sharing between Angola, DRC, and Zambia highlights a structural misalignment: while the DRC received 50 MW from Inga II (with a forecast of 150 MW by 2027), Angola issued Eurobonds for $1.7 billion and implemented a debt-for-health swap for $1 billion, reducing oil-backed debt by 58% by mid-2026. However, this does not imply a reduction in overall financial risk: the debt/GDP ratio is expected to be 44.4%, decreasing only thanks to a GDP rebase.

The lack of an alternative consortium for the Angola-DRC-Zambia interconnection and the reliance on external financing suggest that infrastructure models based on PPPs/DFCs or debt-for-investment swaps do not generate sufficient internal added value to repay debt service, but transfer energy wear and operational risk to national budgets.

Photo by Aaryan Kohli on Unsplash
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