Closure of the Strait of Hormuz and Global LNG Reconfiguration (April–May 2026)
As of February 28, 2026, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz triggered a systemic disruption in global liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows, culminating in the complete suspension of exports by QatarEnergy starting March 2, 2026. The operator declared force majeure on multiple long-term contracts, citing attacks by Iran on critical infrastructure in Ras Laffan and Mesaieed. According to Cedigaz, two liquefaction trains were disabled, removing 12.8 million tons per annum (mtpa) of capacity, equivalent to 17% of Qatar’s total LNG production. The IEA reported that the Strait accounts for approximately 25% of global oil trade and that its closure blocked 20% of global LNG exports, equivalent to approximately 80 mtpa – primarily from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Of these, the 12.8 mtpa from Qatar is attributed to fixed infrastructure damage, while the rest is due to logistical congestion.
Kpler data confirm that no LNG cargo ships transited the Strait between April 1 and May 15, 2026. The EIA reported a daily reduction of 10 billion cubic feet (Bcf/d) in global LNG exports, approximately 20% of the total volume, largely attributed to Ras Laffan. The IEA and Wood Mackenzie independently estimated a daily loss of 1.5 million tons, consistent with the 10 Bcf/d. However, while the IEA attributes the loss solely to Qatar, Wood Mackenzie also includes exports from the United Arab Emirates, with no public source reconciling the overlap. The operator did not disclose the extent of the damage to individual units nor provide timelines for full recovery, despite stating a four-week restoration window in early March.
Spot prices rose rapidly. The European benchmark TTF reached $14.80 per million BTU by April 24, 2026, a 35% increase from pre-crisis levels. In Asia, the Japan-Korea Marker (JKM) reached $16.02/MMBtu, an increase of 51%. Bloomberg L.P. data confirm these figures for the week ending April 24. The EIA reported that prices in India doubled, rising from $10 to $20 per million BTU (a premium of approximately $4 over the regional benchmark, attributable to lower contractual flexibility). Transportation costs also increased: Spark Commodities reported LNG Atlantic rates reaching $161,750 per day on March 3, 2026. Other sources cite daily freight rates between $100,000 and $150,000 on the Gulf-Asia and Gulf-Europe routes, although no unified dataset exists to verify these figures.
QatarEnergy redirected limited exports to India (155,000 tons), Kuwait (114,000 tons), Pakistan (61,000 tons), and an undisclosed destination (458,000 tons) in March 2026, representing only 12.5% of the pre-crisis volume. The Indian government reported a 40% reduction in LNG supplies, with spot prices doubling compared to contractual rates. The Chinese government expressed concern, stating: “The stability of global energy is threatened by regional conflicts, and China calls for a diplomatic solution to restore export routes.” The OAPEC report from the United Arab Emirates noted a 24.1% decrease in LNG exports from both nations in the first quarter of 2026, from 29 to 22 million tons. On April 6, 2026, the ships Al Daayen and Rasheeda attempted to transit the Strait for the first time since the start of the conflict, heading to China, but their destinations were changed during the voyage. On April 23, 2026, QatarEnergy announced the start of exports from the Golden Pass project in Texas, with the first shipment of 174,000 cubic meters – a strategic move, although the volume remains negligible compared to pre-crisis levels.
India’s dependence on Qatar for LNG – previously 41% of total imports – collapsed following a 93% drop in March 2026, when volumes fell from 560,000 to 56,000 tons. The government issued the Natural Gas (Supply Regulation) Order 2026 (March 9, 2026, Ministry of Petroleum), mandating a 100% allocation of gas for residential, transportation, and LPG production, while industrial users faced cuts: fertilizer plants received 70% of previous allocations (a 30% reduction), refineries and power plants 65% (-35%), and manufacturing 80% (-20%). The CNG sector reported “severe stress,” and the fertilizer industry faced supply constraints, with urea stocks at 6.2 million tons – sufficient for 1.8 months of the kharif season demand – while DAP and NPK stocks covered 3.4 and 3.3 months, respectively. In response, India rapidly diversified its sources: US LNG imports increased by 371% in March 2026 compared to February, Oman by 66%, Nigeria by 62%, and Angola emerged as a new supplier. Shell became the leading LNG supplier during the crisis. According to intelligence sources, Russia offered LNG subject to sanctions at a discount of up to 40% through intermediaries in China and Russia, with deliveries routed through Oman or Nigeria. The origin of these shipments – the Arctic LNG-2 and Portovaya projects – was not officially confirmed by India. No public data details the cost of emergency purchases or the integration of Russian LNG into the national grid. The government announced plans to build large LNG storage tanks, but the timelines, location, and funding remain undisclosed.
The European Union’s diversification strategy accelerated in early 2026, with the United States, Algeria, and Nigeria emerging as key suppliers. US LNG imports to Europe increased by 26.7% in February 2026, reaching 276.196 million cubic feet. However, no public data confirms whether these volumes were routed through specific European terminals between April 1 and May 15, 2026. Algerian LNG imports to Spain decreased drastically in May and June 2026 – by 30.6% and 24.4%, respectively – despite Algeria’s historical role as a major supplier. As of May 2026, Spain imported 17.1 TWh from Algeria, down from 24.7 TWh in the same month of the previous year. However, during the same period, there was a 400% increase in LNG regasification at Spanish terminals, suggesting a change in logistics or storage strategy. The operator did not explain the divergence between the decrease in imports and the increase in regasification. Algerian LNG exports to Europe are exempt from origin declaration requirements, a move the European Commission justified as recognition of Algeria’s strategic role, although the logic was not disclosed. The Deutsche Energy Terminal (DET) in Brunsbüttel allocated all regasification capacity for the period June 1 – August 31, 2026 – 58 million MMBtu – but operational data for April-May 2026 remains unreported. Despite the increased inflows, EU gas storage levels were at 32% of total capacity by the end of April 2026, according to Bruegel. The EU has not disclosed whether industrial gas rationing measures – such as a 20% cut for the chemical sector – were implemented in April or May 2026.
Australia became the second-largest global LNG exporter in April 2026, following the suspension of production in Qatar. However, conflicting reports on export growth in March 2026 cite a 15% increase to Asia versus a 25% increase compared to the first quarter. The operator did not explain the 10 percentage point divergence. A cyclone in March 2026 disrupted operations at Chevron and Woodside, reducing export capacity to Asia by 20%. The Kitimat terminal in Canada, operational since July 2025 with a capacity of 14 million tons per year, contributed to the global supply without publishing usage data for 2026. The Asian JKM index fell to $10/MMBtu in April 2026 from $19/MMBtu in March, according to JOGMEC, while other sources report fluctuations between $15 and $18/MMBtu, with a low of $15/MMBtu on April 21. Kpler notes stable prices at $11.50/MMBtu in May 2026, while the TTF price increased by 8% month-over-month. Long-term contracts reveal adjustments: CNOOC and TotalEnergies modified their SPA in 2024, increasing the volume from 1 to 1.5 mtpa and extending the duration, although the impact on April-May 2026 flows remains unverified. Australia and Singapore strengthened trade ties, with Australia supplying approximately one-third of Singapore’s LNG. The twenty-year Qatar-South Korea agreement, effective from 2025, increased South Korea’s annual imports from 6.1 to 8.1 million tons. Qatar announced a target to expand capacity by 13% by 2030 and a reported offer of lower prices to India, without details on volume or implementation date. A twenty-seven-year contract with China was announced, without specifics. Qatar reduced exports to Europe by 30% in April-May 2026, attributing it to Iranian attacks, but no public document details the operational impact or recovery efforts. The lack of a unified source for US and Australian exports leaves the extent of the change unverified.
The confirmed fact is that Australia’s position as the second-largest global LNG exporter was confirmed in April 2026, following the suspension of production in Qatar due to infrastructure damage. This change, although documented, remains unquantified in terms of volume variation between April and May 2026.
Photo by Athanasios Papazacharias on Unsplash
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